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Felony Trials Without a Jury. Recent crime surveys have shown
that the majority of contested felony cases are never tried in open court,
being settled instead by the striking of a "bargain" between the de-
fendant and the prosecuting officer. Administrative discretion has thus
largely supplanted judge and jury alike. The practice has been severely
criticized by Professor Moley, who characterizes it as "psychologically
more akin to a game of poker than to a process of justice," being
"an attempt to get as much as possible from an unwilling giver"
rather than "a search for truth."' In view of the technicalities and
delay that were permitted to develop in connection with jury trials,
the utilization of some such avenue of escape would seem to have been
inevitable. The practice may be expected to develop still further un-
less judicial procedure is improved to a point where a trial becomes an
efficient means of disposing of contested criminal cases.
In most jurisdictions, the only alternative to such a compromise
agreement has been a jury trial. Trial by a judge alone, the right to a
jury being waived, has been regarded as of doubtful constitutionality.
Recent decisions of the federal Supreme Court2 and of the supreme
court of Illinois,3 sustaining such non-jury trials even in the absence
of statutory authorization, have gone far toward dispelling this doubt,
I Raymond Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution (1929), p. 189. Chapters 7
and 8 contain an excellent discussion of this phase of the subject, which is beyond
the scope of the present note. The recent Al Capone fiasco in the federal district
court sitting in Chicago shows the methods employed, and also illustrates the
manner in which such compromise agreements occasionally fall through because
the judge refuses to cobperate with the prosecution. See infra, pp. 8, 10.
2 Patton v. United States (1930), 281 U.S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253. Although this
was not a true waiver case, the facts having been found by a jury of eleven men,
the opinion states that we "must treat both forms of waiver as in substance
amounting to the same thing." But cf. Commonwealth v. Hall (1928), 291 Pa.
341, 140 A. 626, 58 A. L. R. 1023. I discuss this conflict of opinion, together with
the other constitutional and statutory problems involved in the non-jury trial of
felony cases, in an article which is to appear in the California Law Beview for
January, 1932.
'People v. Fisher (1930), 340 Ill. 250, 172 N.E. 722.
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and warrant an examination of the practical working of the waiver
plan in those jurisdictions where it has been given a trial. In seven
states' the practice of allowing such a waiver is of sufficient maturity
to justify drawing rather definite conclusions, and the developments
thus far in the courts of the federal government and of seven other
states5 which have adopted the practice within the last five years
furnish evidence of what may-be expected in the future.
Frequency of Waiver: State Courts. There is the greatest divergence
as to the frequency with which advantage is taken of the right to dis-
pense with a jury trial upon a plea of "not guilty" of felony. In
Connecticut,' MarylandJ and Wisconsin,8 trial by the court has be-
'Connecticut (1921), Acts 1921, c. 267, s. 2; Indiana (1905), Burns' Anno.
Stat. 1926, s. 2299; Maryland (1852), Code 1924, art. xxvii, s. 549; New Jersey
(1898), Comp. Stat. 1910, s. 13; Oklahoma (1911), Cowden v. State, 5 Okl. Cr.
71, reversing In re McQuown (1907), 19 Okl. 347, 91 P. 681, and holding that art.
vii, e. 20 of the constitution of 1907 applies to criminal as well as civil cases;
Washington (Territorial Act), Bemington's Comp. Stat., 1922, s. 2144; Wisconsin
(1925), Laws 1925, c. 124, s. 1. Special acts authorizing waiver in various Wis-
consin counties, except in capital cases, date from 1881. For the Maryland prac-
tice of waiving a jury at common law, see Carroll T. Bond, "The Maryland
Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges Alone, Without Juries," in 11 Amer.
Bar Assoc. Jour. 699 (1925), and Judicial Council of Massachusetts, First Report
(1925), p. 97. Only the Washington law excepts capital cases. Connecticut, Acts
1927, c. 107, provides that such cases shall be tried by a bench of three judges.
In Oklahoma, the prosecuting attorney, and in Indiana the court as well, must
consent to such a waiver before it can become effective.
5 California (1928), Constitution, art. 1, s. 7; Illinois (1930), People v. Fisher,
op. cit., supra note 2; Massachusetts (1929), Gen. Laws, c. 263, e. 6; Michigan
(1927), Acts 1927, pp. 284, 318; Ohio (1929), Code 1930, ss. 13442-4, 13442-5;
Rhode Island (1929), Gen. Laws, c. 407, s. 78; Virginia (1928), Constitution, art.
i, s. 8. Massachusetts excepts capital cases. In Rhode Island the consent of the
court, and in Virginia of the prosecuting attorney as well, is required.
* Lucius P. Fuller, clerk of the superior court for Hartford county, writes that
"the jury is waived in probably more than three-fourths of the cases which are
tried." Letter dated May 12, 1931. From Waterbury comes news that "nearly half
of our eases are now tried by the court." Letter from Mr. George H. Freeman,
clerk of the Superior Court, dated May 6, 1931. In Bridgeport, 21 cases, ranging
in seriousness from assault with intent to murder, to lascivious carriage, were
tried by the Superior Court without a jury between September, 1929, and July,
1930. Letter from Mr. Michael J. Flanagan, clerk, dated May 9, 1931. Mr. Richard
H. Phillips, reporter of the Supreme Court of Errors, and until recently secretary
of the Judicial Council, summarizing the situation for the state as a whole, says
that "very few criminal cases are tried to the jury, the accused almost always
preferring to be tried to the court." The distinction between felonies and mis-
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come the general rule, while in Oklahoma' and Washingtono the
statutes have been virtually ignored. Indiana and New Jersey, the
demeanors has been abolished in Connecticut; hence no separate figures are avail-
able as to felonies and the major misdemeanors. (Only the more serious criminal
prosecutions are tried in the Superior Court.) The belief seems to be general that
there is little difference, so far as waiver is concerned, as between what other juris-
dictions would denominate felonies and misdemeanors, respectively, the controlling
factors being other than the seriousness of the penalty that follows conviction.
'In the Supreme Bench of Baltimore, which tries all felonies as well as the
major misdemeanors, the non-jury criminal trials have consistently averaged 95
per cent. In 1927, 4,588 cases were tried to the court, while only 229 were tried
with juries. California Judicial Council, Second Report (1929), p.4 4 . Cf. the circuit
court for Washington county, Hagerstown, where approximately 25 per cent of the
contested felony cases are tried without a jury. Letter from Mr. Edward Oswald,
clerk, dated May 20, 1931.
8 "In 1929, there were 1,852 cases brought before the Municipal Court, thirteen
of which were pending on January 1st, 1929. Seven of these cases were pending on
January 1st, 1930, which made a total of 1,845 cases disposed of during the year.
The total of cases, nolled, dismissed, transferred to the Circuit Court, cases in
which the defendants were adjudicated insane before trial and committed, and so
forth, amounted to 76. Deducting this figure from the 1,845 cases disposed of
leaves a balance of 1,769. Deducting 988 pleas of guilty, leaves a balance of 781
cases that were contested; 104 of these were jury trials, and 677 were tried on
waivers. This amounts to approximately 13 per cent jury trials and 87 per cent
waivers of jury. In 1930, there were 2,053 cases before the court, eight of which
were pending on January 1st, 1931. This left a balance of 2,045 cases disposed
of. Eighty-eight of these cases were disposed of by being nolled and dismissed, and
by transfer to the Circuit Court, others by reason of the defendants being adjudi-
cated insane before the trial and committed, and so forth. This left a total of 1,957
cases. Of these, 1,045 were disposed of on pleas of guilty, leaving a balance of
912 contested cases. There were 130 jury issues and 782 waivers. This amounts to
approximately 14 per cent juries and 86 per cent waivers of juries." Letter from
Hon. George A. Shaughnessy, judge of the Municipal Court of Milwaukee, dated
May 25, 1931. This court tries felony cases exclusively. It will be noted that the
proportion of cases disposed of other than by actual trial is exceptionally low.
Cf. Illinois Crime Survey (1929), p. 102. Milwaukee authorities attribute this in
part to the advantages accruing from the non-jury trial.
'Mr. Phil K. Oldham, county attorney of Muskogee county, writes: "I have
been in this office for almost six years and have never tried a defendant before
the court without a jury. . . . I am sure that you will find this situation all over
the state." Letter dated June 22, 1931. Mr. W. L. Coffey, county attorney of Tulsa
county, writes that "it is very seldom that defendants in this state waive their
right of trial by jury." In his own county, such waivers average less than two a
year. Letter dated June 24, 1931. Mr. Lewis R. Morris, county attorney of Okla-
homa county, the most populous in the state, reports two non-jury trials during the
first six months of the year. In twelve years' practice of criminal law, his firm
HeinOnline  -- 25 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 982 1931
JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE
two remaining states in which the legality of the practice is of com-
paratively long standing, occupy a middle ground." The same is true
of the new converts to the rule. In Virginia, the judge has definitely
gained a monopoly,12 Illinois13 and California" appear to be tending
never handled a case in which the defendant pled not guilty and waived a jury
trial. Letter dated July 13, 1931.
'aMr. Benjamin T. Hart, chief deputy to the clerk of the Superior Court of
King county (Seattle), writes that "waivers come so infrequently," in misde-
meanor as well as felony cases, that neither he nor any one in the office of the
presiding judge can recall such a waiver in recent months. Letter dated April 30,
1931. Mr. Charles W. Greenough, prosecuting attorney for Spokane county, states
that during his eight years' incumbency "we have had but one case which was
submitted to the court." Letter dated May 6, 1931. From Tacoma comes word
that " To my knowledge no defendant in Pierce county during the past seven years
has taken advantage of [the statute] authorizing a waiver of trial by jury....
Inquiry has been made of other members of this office and of the judges, and no
case has been recalled by any of them. Letter from Prosecuting Attorney Bertil E.
Johnson, dated May 8, 1931. The same news comes from the rural sections. "In
the eight years that I have been in this office," writes Mr. Charles E. Vetter,
clerk of the superior court of Yakima county, "there have been but two instances
where [a jury was waived]. One was a case of driving while drunk, and the other
was a liquor case under the felony penalty." Letter dated May 4, 1931. Mr. Archie
B. Stewart, county clerk of Whatcom county, cannot recall a single instance of
such a waiver. Letter dated May 2, 1931. .
11 See S. C. Oppenheim, "Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases" (1927),
25 Mich. L. Rev. 695. In both states, waiver in misdemeanor cases is the general
rule, although the proportion is much lower in offenses of the more serious grade.
In Passaic county (Paterson), of the 855 trials on indictments during 1930 not
more than 5 per cent were by jury. (The figures include both misdemeanors and
''high misdemeanors.'' The word "felony" is not used in New Jersey). Letter
from Mr. Lloyd B. Marsh, county clerk, dated May 29, 1931. Non-jury trials be-
came so frequent that in 1926 the New Jersey legislature created a special system
of criminal district courts to try only those cases where indictment and trial by
jury are waived.
12"In the two and one-half years that this provision has been in effect we
have not had a single case of a felony jury of less than the former number of 12,
but . . . probably 70 per cent of the pleas of not guilty are now tried by the
court without a jury. Letter from Mr. Thomas R. Miller, deputy clerk, Hustings
Court, Richmond, dated May 16, 1931. (The Virginia statute authorizes a complete
waiver, or an agreement upon any number of jurors less than 12. Doubtless the
real purpose of the latter is to validate a conviction following the forced dis-
missal of a juror).
13 Since the decision in People v. Fisher (1930), op. cit., supra note 13, 'juries
have been waived in two-thirds of the cases tried in the Criminal Court" of Chi-
cago, and a like proportion in the other courts. Judicial Advisory Council of Cook
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in that direction. A recent survey of felony prosecutions in Detroit
revealed that for a nine months' period the cases tried to a jury num-
bered 1,271, while in 1,593 cases a jury was waived.'5 On the other
hand, news comes from Lansing that in Ingham county, Michigan,
there has been but one waiver of a jury trial in the course of the last
year." In Boston, approximately 11 per cent of the felony trials are
without a jury ;17 in Cleveland, only 45 waivers have been recorded
out of a list of 1,544 indictments.'8 And in Rhode Island, the Judicial
Council, after a vigorous and successful battle for the passage of a
waiver statute, is protesting that thus far the act has been virtually a
dead letter.19
County, First Report (1931), p. 27. Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, judge of the Superior
Court and a member of the Council, writes: "I am not thoroughly advised as to
the percentage of jury waivers between felonies and misdemeanors, but under-
stand that there is no difference. In fact, 68 per cent of such waivers relate to
our Criminal Court, which tries only felonies in so far as the first count of the
indictment is concerned." Letter dated May 18, 1931. See also Judicial Advisory
Council of Illinois, First Report (1930), p. 26.
"For the year ending June 30, 1930, 659 of the 2,270 contested felony cases
were tried to the court. This is 29 per cent. For the four metropolitan counties,
Alameda (Berkeley, Oakland), Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, the
proportions were 18.4, 43.6, 23.2, and 11.0 per cent, respectively. In comparison,
of the 223 misdemeanor cases tried in the Superior Court, which handles all
felony cases, the proportion of waivers to total cases tried was 42.6 per cent for
the state at large, and 41.7, 57.7, 15.5, and 28.6 per cent, respectively, for the
four metropolitan counties. It will be noted that in the Los Angeles courts, which
handle approximately 46 per cent of all the cases, non-jury trials are far more
frequent than in the balance of the state. The Judicial Council, in its Third Report
(1931), p. 35, states: "During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1929, out of a
total of 867 contested criminal trials, 241, or slightly more than 27 per cent, were
heard without a jury. In the following year this ratio had increased quite con-
siderably, with the result that approximately 44 per cent of all the defendants
tried waived a jury." It is hard to say what figures those cited for 1928-29 repre-
sent; Appendix B clearly shows that 1,254 persons were convicted of felony in that
year. The statement regarding 1929-30 was apparently taken from an estimate in
the Second Beport (1929), p. 45; but this prediction failed to materialize. I have
prepared my figures from Appendices B and C of the Council's Third Beport.
" Judicial Council of California, Second Report (1929), p. 45.
" Letter from Miss Flora G. Dewey, deputy county clerk, dated May 27, 1931.
" Letter from Mr. John R. Campbell, clerk of the criminal court, dated May
11, 1931. Waiver is most frequent in morals cases.
"Letter from Hon. Homer G. Powell, chief justice of the court of common
pleas, dated May 5, 1931.
" Fourth Beport (1930), p. 8. The statistical summaries appended to the Report
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Frequency of Waiver: Federal Courts. After the advent of national
prohibition and the consequent deluge of federal liquor prosecutions,"o
the apparent necessity that all criminal trials in the district courts,
for misdemeanors as well as felonies, be by jury2' was a constant
source of complaint on the part of all who wished to see these tribunals
given at least a Chinaman's chance to keep up with their dockets. 22
However, at least one federal district judge doubted that trial by
jury was necessary, even in the absence of further legislation. Hon.
Albert W. Johnson, sitting for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
as long ago as 1926 adopted the practice of permitting the defense
and the prosecution to waive a jury in any criminal case.2 ' That the
show but five instances of non-jury criminal trials, including misdemeanors as well
as felonies, in the courts of general jurisdiction during a year's time. In fact,
as the Council bitterly complained in its First Report (1927), p. 23, 'of the civil
trials only some 2 or 3 per cent are without jury."
"'It is probable that [in 1929] more persons were prosecuted in the federal
court for violations of the prohibition laws than were prosecuted in the state
courts for all criminal offenses." Judicial Council of Idaho, First Report (1930),
p. 12.
1 That such was the law was accepted as settled by the decisions in Thompson
v. Utah (1897), 170 U.S. 343, 345, 18 8. Ct. 620 (dictwm); Dickinson v. U.S.
(C.C.A. 1908), 159 F. 801; Low v. U.S. (C.C.A. 1909), 169 F. 86; and Coates v.
U.S. (C.C.A. 1923), 290 F. 134. The opinions even threw a cloud of doubt upon
the power of Congress to authorize criminal trials without a jury, or with one of
less than 12 men, the defendant consenting. Only "petty offenses" were excepted
-Schick v. U.S. (1903), 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826-and no one appeared ready to
champion the doctrine that a violation of the "law of all laws" was a petty
offense, at least under the existing provisions of the Volstead Act. See the article
cited supra, note 2.
2 See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report Sup-
plemental to the Preliminary Report on Observance and Enforcement of Prohibi-
tion (1930), House of Representatives, 71st. Congress, 2d. Session, Document No.
252, pp. 20 ff.
' Letter from Hon. A. W. Johnson, dated May 25, 1931. Judge Johnson ex-
plains: "As you understand, until . . . April 14, 1930 [the date of the Patton case,
op. cit., supra note 1], the legality of the waiver of jury trials was questioned,
but notwithstanding this doubt on account of the large number of cases I per-
mitted [it]. I do not know of any other district in which such procedure pre-
vailed. " Nor does the present writer know of any such practice elsewhere. But
see infra, note 47. It seems a little strange that this practice should have been
first followed by a judge sitting in the state of Pennsylvania, who, immediately
preceding his appointment to the federal bench, had for ten years been a judge
of the state court of common pleas, Pennsylvania being one of the states in which
a belief in the illegality of a waiver of jury trial at common law has been most
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procedure was acceptable to all concerned is shown not only by the
frequency with which it was followed, but likewise by the fact that
it was not attacked in the appellate courts.
In this district, of course, the sole effect of the Patton decision 24
has been to enable the court and the United States attorney's office
to breathe a little more freely while following out their old practice.
"Today," writes Judge Johnson, "at least 90 per cent of all our
criminal cases [in this district] are tried to the court without a jury
by . . . agreement of counsel. The court does not urge or even en-
courage this . . . but the lawyers desire to try their criminal cases in
this way. . . . In difficult and serious cases I much prefer to have a
jury dispose of the facts than to dispose of them myself.25 Neverthe-
less, the fact remains that trial by jury, in felony as well as mis-
demeanor cases, now occupies a very secondary place in this jurisdic-
tion.
Outside of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, there appear to be
few instances in which the practice of trial by judge alone has as
yet struck root, and none in which it has gained such a preiminent
position. From Philadelphia comes word that "we have never had
in this district a waiver of the right to a jury in any criminal case, " 2
which is duplicated in letters from federal courts sitting in the states
of Arizona,27 Connecticut, 2  IllinoiS (Northern District) ,2 Maine,s0
constantly respected. See Commonwealth v. Hall (1928), 219 Pa. 341, 140 A. 626,
where Mr. Chief Justice Mosehzisker, who was unusually well informed upon trial
courts in general, and jury trial in particular, stated (p. 354) that the case at
bar appeared to be the first instance where a Pennsylvania judge, on a plea of not
guilty, had undertaken to try an indictable offense without a jury. Had the prac-
tice first arisen in Maryland, it would have been less surprising. See the article by
Mr. Chief Justice Bond, op. cit., supra note 4.
24Op. cit., supra note 2.
25 Op. cit., supra note 23.
I Letter from Judge 0. B. Dickinson, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, dated
May 25, 1931.
' "We have, however, had a few cases in which the defendant has stipulated to
be tried by a jury of less than twelve, but those cases are rare indeed. This ap-
plies both to felony and niisdemeanor actions." Letter from Judge F. C. Jacobs,
dated May 22, 1931.
"'During my eighteen years' experience on the bench I do not recall any
case where the defendant in a criminal action waived a jury. That procedure is
common in Connecticut state courts, but it has never been adopted in this federal
district. This is true of both felony and misdemeanor prosecutions." Letter from
Judge Edwin S. Thomas, dated May 25, 1931.
986
HeinOnline  -- 25 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 986 1931
JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE 987
Massachusetts, 3' Minnesota,32 Nebraska,33 New Jersey," New York
(Eastern and Southern Districts)," North Carolina (Middle Dis-
trict) , Ohio (Northern District)," Rhode Island,5 South Dakota,"
Washington (Eastern District),4o West Virginia (Northern District),"
" Judge George A. Carpenter, states that he "never accepts a waiver of a
jury in a criminal case." Letter dated May 20, 1931.
S"We have had no such trials here either before or since the [Patton case],
and I think we are not likely to have many. They [the defendants] rather think
the jury is their only hope. Even in misdemeanor cases, they go to a jury, so
you can put this district down as being strong for the jury trial so far as de-
fendants in criminal cases are concerned." Letter from Judge John A. Peters,
dated May 25, 1931.
"'I have been a judge of the federal district court for Massachusetts for
eight years. During that time I have never known a jury trial in a criminal case
to have been waived." Letter from Hon. James A. Lowell, dated May 26, 1931.
SIHon. William A. Cant, letter dated May 27, 1931. Judge Cant feels that
waivers may be expected in the future, "but not many for a considerable time to
come."
""There has been no instance of a waiver . . . in any criminal case. Letter
from Judge Thomas C. Munger, dated May 23, 1931.
" Judge William Clark states: "In six years' experience I have never known
the waiver of jury trials." Judge John B. Avis recalls a recent case where ''the
defendant's counsel offered to go to trial without a jury, but the United States
attorney objected, and the case was submitted to a jury." Letters dated May 25,
1931.
* Hon. Grover M. Moscowitz, Eastern District of New York, states: "No non-
jury trials, either felonies or misdemeanors, have been tried before me, or any
other judge of the court so far as I have known." Letter dated May 18, 1931.
Judge Bondy, New York City, writes to the same effect, concerning the Southern
District. Letter dated May 22, 1931.
" Judge Johnson J. Haynes states that in prosecutions growing out of the pro-
hibition law, the Mann Act, and the Dyer Act, defendants frequently offer to try
the case to the court, but since he believes that "where the facts are in dispute
the jury should determine the matter'' such offers are rejected. Letter dated May
25, 1931.
07 "We have had no requests for waivers of juries in the trials of criminal
cases." Letter from Mr. Lawrence Lennon, secretary to the judges, Northern
District of Ohio, dated May 27, 1931.
" No offers to waive juries have been made. Letter from Miss Alice E. Richards,
secretary to Judge Letts, dated May 25, 1931.
""I am aware of the decision [Patton v. U.S.] that you refer to, but not a
single defendant has taken advantage of that privilege in this district." Letter
from Judge James D. Elliott, dated May 25, 1931.
""I am familiar with Patton v. United States, decided in April, 1930, but not-
withstanding this decision, no criminal cases, either felonies or misdemeanors, in
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and Wisconsin (Eastern District) .42 Hon. Frank H. Kerrigan, district
judge for the Northern District of California, writes that "there have
been but two ... criminal cases tried in this district wherein a jury
trial was waived. . . . Needless to say, the proportion of these eases to
the total number of criminal cases tried is negligible. 3 In the North-
ern District of Texas, juries are waived in two or three cases per term,
but these are generally misdemeanor rather than felony actions."
However, in the Southern District of California,45 the District of Mary-
land, 6 and the Western District of North Carolina,"4 the non-jury trial
my district, are tried to the court without a jury. I do not feel that under the
Patton case the trial of criminal eases without a jury is to be pursued as a prac-
tice. I think the rule is intended to be applied with circumspection in special cir-
cumstances." Letter from Judge J. Stanley Webster, dated June 10, 1931.
u II have had no such waiver either in felony or misdemeanor cases in my
court. About 98 per cent of the criminal cases instituted in this court are on con-
fessions. The others are tried by jury." Letter from Judge W. E. Baker, dated
May 19, 1931.
I Letter from Judge F. A. Geiger, dated May 18, 1931.
" Letter dated May 22, 1931. His statement that "in both the state courts and
the United States district courts in California it has never become customary to
waive a jury trial in criminal cases amounting to a felony" would seem to show
that he is not aware of recent developments. See supra note 14 and infra note
45.
" Letter from Judge William H. Atwell, dated May 18, 1931.
"Hon. Samuel W. McNabb, United States attorney for the district, estimates
that since the decision of the Patton case, juries have been waived in approxi-
mately 25 per cent of all contested cases. He adds: "There are no special types
of cases in which waivers have been particularly noticeable, nor is there any par-
ticular difference with regard to felony or misdemeanor actions. In our courts,
however, a large percentage of the eases coming on for trial are felony cases."
Letter dated June 12, 1931.
""Since April 14, 1930 [the date of the Patton case] . . . the records of this
court disclose that 16 defendants have elected to waiver a jury. These were all
cases under the national prohibition act, seven of them being brought under pro-
visions of that act relating to offenses which constituted misdemeanors, and nine
under provisions constituting felonies." Letter from Judge William C. Coleman
dated May 19, 1931. In view of the practice in the state courts, one would have
expected a much larger number of non-jury trials. See supra note 7.
17 "I estimate that during the past two years in my jurisdiction 85 to 90 per
cent of the cases tried in my court were disposed of on pleas of guilty. Five to
ten per cent of the other cases are submitted to me to pass upon the evidence . . .
and not over five per cent are contested before a jury." Letter from Judge Edwin
Yates Webb, dated May 28, 1931. Prior to the Patton case, non-jury trials were
secured through an agreement to plead guilty if the judge found that the evi-
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has taken definite root, and has already shown signs of becoming, in
time, the rule rather than the exception.
In the District of Columbia, to which the rule of the Patton case's
would seem equally applicable, "there have been only four felony
cases out of approximately two hundred set down for trial (during
the current court year, which began in October, 1930) in which the
defendant has waived a jury and stood trial before the court."'
None of the cases was important, and only one of the five defendants
involved was convicted.50 The practice of waiving a jury in misde-
meanor cases is of long standing in the District of Columbia, having
been sanctioned by act of Congress since 1892.5'
Of course it is true that "the time which has elapsed since the an-
nouncement of the decision in Patton v. United States ... .52 has not
been sufficiently long to develop the possibilities which that decision
carries with it." Judge Atwell feels that "the bar is generally of
the opinion-I mean those gentlemen who practice criminal law-that
a jury cannot be waived in a felony case. They do not appear to be
generally aware of the Patton case."' In the course of time, as the
practice becomes less novel and the antipathy of the Federal bench
toward accepting the additional duties involved decreases in inten-
sity,55 it is to be expected that it will be more generally utilized. But
dence sustained the charge. Otherwise, the district attorney agreed to nol. pros.
the case. Such a procedure is in use today in many jurisdictions where a waiver
is illegal. In some courts, including the Municipal Court of Milwaukee, even legiti-
mate pleas of guilty are handled in this manner, as experience has shown that
occasionally defendants plead guilty of charges of which they are innocent.
" Op. cit., supra note 2.
4 Letter from Hon. Leo A. Rover, United States attorney, District of Columbia,
dated May 27, 1931.
0 Ibid.
" Code of the District of Columbia 1929, Title 18, s. 165, p. 167, sustained in
Belt v. United States (1894), 4 App. D.C. 25, 22 Wash. Law Rep. 447. The Su-
preme Court refusing to review the case, In re Belt (1895), 159 U.S. 95, 15 S.
Ct. 987, the decision of the Court of Appeals of the District has stood unchallenged
since that date. See the article cited supra note 2.
2 Op. cit., supra note 2.
51Op. cit., supra note 32.
"Op. cit., supra note 44. And see supra note 2.
0 The wide scope and intensity of this feeling is evident from the general tenor
of the letters received. Few question the legality of waiver under the Patton case
(op. cit., supra note 2), but many apparently doubt the desirability of the practice
as applied to their court.
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any belief that the present lack of waivers is due entirely, or even
largely, to the newness of the rule should be rudely dispelled by the
experiences of Washington,5 6 Oklahoma,5 7 and Rhode Island.58 What
doubt remains should be disposed of by the experiences of Alabama
and Delaware in misdemeanor prosecutions. In the former state, a
jury may be had only if the defendant, in advance of trial demands
it." Such a demand is almost always made; in fact, "it is a rare thing,
practically unknown, for a defendant to consent to trial by the court
without a jury." 60 And in Delaware, although the statutes authorize
a defendant in a misdemeanor ease to waive a jury and have his case
tried to a bench of from one to three judges,8' the attorney-general
estimates that this is done in "less than one per cent" of the cases.62
Types of Cases where a Jury is Waived.6" Few definite tendencies to
waive a jury in particular types of cases, while refraining from doing
so in others, are discernible. The most that can be said is that in cer-
tain "morals" actions, more particularly offenses against women and
young girls, and, in some jurisdictions, liquor cases, defendants appear
anxious to evade a jury. In other jurisdictions, the situation is the
reverse, defense counsel apparently feeling that their greatest chance
of success lies with the "twelve good men and true" in the jury box.
Thus in the District of Columbia, in misdemeanor actions, 95 per
cent of all prohibition and gaming prosecutions are tried by jury, the
defendants waiving a jury in only one case in twenty; for the balance
of the offenses the proportion is just the reverse." Obviously, the con-
trolling factors are not so much the particular charge or the possible
penalty involved, but rather what defense counsel considers "good
psychology" in the case at hand. The former are important only in
so far as they influence the latter. And "good psychology" involves
the matter of personalities, including those of the judge, the probable
jurors, and the lawyers themselves.
0 Op. cit., supra note 10.
17 Op. cit., supra note 9.
"I Op. cit., supra note 19.
" Code 1923, s. 4647. Of course a different rule prevails as to "petty offenses."
a Letter from Hon. Walter B. Jones, Montgomery, Alabama, dated April 28,
1931. Judge Jones is speaking of the general practice in the entire state.
* Laws, 1927, c. 233 S.I.
61 Letter from Attorney-General Reuben Satterthwaite, Jr., dated May 14, 1931.
a Because of requests from many who furnished information for this section,
fewer statements as to sources are given.
" Op. cit., supra note 49.
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If the defense is technical, or involves fine-spun distinctions between
"fact" and "law," 6 5 and more particularly if the evidence is limited
and none too clear, there seems to be a tendency to regard the trained
mind of the judge as more certain to render a favorable verdict than
would be true should the case go to a jury. On the contrary, where
counsel is pretty certain of his client's guilt, but has a few misleading
incidents, he prefers a jury, figuring that he may get one or two to
go off on a tangent and thus get a compromise, verdict, if not an ac-
quittal or a hung jury.
Two of the four instances of felony waivers in the District of Co-
lumbia 66 are cases in point. In one case, two defendants were ac-
cused of grand larceny. Both had rather lengthy records, but wished
to take the stand in their own defense. Feeling that the prosecution's
case was not a strong one, but that their chances of acquittal might be
jeopardized the moment the jury was informed, on cross examination,
of their prior convictions, their attorney chose to try the case to the
court. Subsequently, one was convicted and the other acquitted. The
second instance was a narcotics action in which the prosecution had a
strong case, the principal defense being that most of the evidence had
been secured through an illegal search, and hence was inadmissible.
Doubting that ability of a jury to overlook such evidence once it had
been brought to its attention-and it is extremely difficult to prevent
all (legally speaking) irrelevant facts from reaching the ears of the
jury-counsel chose to present the case to the court, and, winning his
point, secured the acquittal of his client.
The latter case illustrates one of the least satisfactory features of
our present rules of procedure-and a possible solution. "Instruc-
tions" from the judge to "disregard" the facts are no solution at all.
It takes a mind "learned in the law," and understanding, or at least
believing to understand, "the reason of the rule," to apply it in all
its pristine purity.
Another element that tends to influence the choice of a non-jury
trial is the fear of the effect of popular feeling upon the minds of the
jurors in certain types of cases of a revolting nature. This is particu-
larly true where the defendant's past record is not of the highest.
5 "The existence of a jury makes of the distinction between law and facts an
essential principle of the procedure, while one of the main features of the common
law is precisely its failure to distinguish facts and law " Pierre Lepaulle, "Jury,
Democracy, and Efficiency," Forum, July, 1928, p. 52.
" Op. cit., supra note 49.
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Justice often demands that we "protect those coming into court from
the heart, the nerves, the obscure instincts and passions of the crowd
and the mob. . . . It requires not only great intelligence and character,
but also professional training, to resist the pressure of public opinion
and judge a case on the actual evidence."1eT The judge, not alone be-
cause of this training, but likewise because of this less sentimental at-
titude, may come closer to doing this than would the laymen on the
jury. Trained to detect the weak links in a chain of circumstantial
evidence, to look beyond mere race prejudice to the actual fait accom-
pli, and bound by the code of ethics of his profession, he may often be
the one beacon of hope in a sea of despair. But let us not wax too elo-
quent on the subject! The present writer has just visited a locality
where "trial by newspaper" is as common in a non-jury as in a jury
trial; where the judge banks upon sensationalism as his greatest friend;
and where assignment to the criminal branch is looked upon as a no less
sure stepping stone to higher offices "in the gift of the people" than
are positions in the office of the prosecuting attorney.
Like many another question, that of the effect of delay upon the
.waiver of jury trial has at least two sides. Many federal judges doubt
that any general practice of waiver can develop while their courts
are as hopelessly swamped with litigation as they are at the present
time. As long as over eight-ninths of all convictions in prohibition
cases are on pleas of guilty-a large proportion of them entered on
"bargain days' "68-this doubt would seem to be well founded. Since
the prosecution cannot possibly press for trial more than a very small
percentage of the cases where the defendant stands upon his right to
be considered innocent until convicted "in due course of law," it
would seem to be the height of irrationality to exchange the advantages
of the bargain sale of sentences for those of the non-jury trial. On
the other hand, the poor litigant who is unable to make bail, and must
stay in jail to await a trial by jury, is more apt to prefer a prompt
trial before the judge alone.
Benefits and Detriments of Waiver: To the State. Aside from the
possibility of more accurate decisions, at least in certain types of
cases or under certain sets of circumstances, the non-jury trial has
6 Op. cit., supra note 65, at pp. 50, 53.
* National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the
Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws of the United States (1931), 71st Congress,
3rd. Session, House Document No. 722, p. 56.
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certain definite advantages as a time and money saver, and as a restora-
tive of more business-like methods in criminal trials. Chief Justice
Bond estimates that in Maryland the non-jury trial of a given case
requires not more than a third of the time which would be required
to try the same case with a jury,"9 and the experiences of other juris-
dictions appear to support this as a general rule. In many instances
a case could have been tried and disposed of by a judge in less time
than it has taken to impanel the jury. The financial saving, in view
of the fact that a jury trial costs the state, speaking conservatively,
in the neighborhood of from $150 to $200 per day7 0-and for a short
day-is evident. But one may question the argument of dollars and
cents when applied to felony trials. If economy be our object, we
might better start with the civil jury. At least in the field of criminal
law, the true advantages of speedier justice lie elsewhere.
Of as great importance as the saving in time is the greater security
against error, and consequently the greater certainty of finality. Non-
jury trials are less technical, more business-like, and surer footed.
"Appoint a keen, critical, and trained mind to pass upon the facts
and you will eliminate more worthless material than by all the rules
of evidence; "7' for lawyers do not like to make fools of themselves.
That paradox of legal science, the judge's charge to the jury, is, of
legal necessity, often prepared to pass muster before an appellate
court rather than to enlighten the jury. Even so, error creeps in; and
the concomitant of error is further litigation, and possibly a new
trial. Not the least of the advantages of the non-jury trial is the
elimination of a new trial.
In short, "If more speedy, less costly, and more dignified trials, ar-
riving at more accurate results, are a desirable goal in the administra-
tion of justice, then the trial of criminal cases without a jury," the
defendant willing, is a step in the right direction.7 2 If it be alleged
that this places too great a burden upon the shoulders of the judge,
it is replied that the burden is placed where it logically belongs. If
in certain types of cases it be too great a burden for a single man, then
why not copy the Maryland practice, as old as the state itself, of giv-
ing him the moral and mental support of one or two of his colleagues!
0 Op. cit., supra note 4.
ro The Judicial Council of Rhode Island sets the figure at $185 for the principal
trial courts of that state. First Report (1927), p. 10.
" Op. cit., supra note 65, at p. 53.
" Massachusetts Judicial Council, Third Beport (1927), p. 112.
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Although but little evidence is available, such statistics as exist
would seem to indicate that the extensive use of the non-jury trial
tends to increase the proportion of actual trials at the expense of the
nolle prosequi and the "bargain" plea of guilty. In Milwaukee, where
over 85 per cent of all felony trials are by a judge alone, only two
per cent of the pleas of guilty are of an offense other than that charged
in the original indictment or information.7 8 In Chicago, however, dur-
ing the period when all trials were by jury, 79 per cent of such pleas
were of a lesser offense.74 Although it was impossible to isolate the
contributing factors, those who conducted the Illinois Crime Survey
were led to believe that the method of trial was of controlling im-
portance.75 Professor Moley has found such a tendency at work in
other jurisdictions, notably Connecticut. 76 Further data, however, is
necessary before reliable conclusions can be drawn.
Benefits and Detriments of Waiver: To the Accused. This question
has already been largely answered in our consideration of the causes
of waiver. Suffice it to say that there are cases where it is a positive
injustice to deny the defendant the right to waive a jury; where
the right to refuse to be "tried by one's country" is as valuable a right
as that to trial by jury itself. These facts would seem to invalidate
much of the dicta of the reports that such a procedure is "contrary
to public policy," and "cannot be tolerated," and to relegate them
to the category of Lord Coke's equally famous dictum that the com-
mon law forced the defendant to stand mute before the altar of justice,
like the lamb before the altar of its God, without counsel, without
process to secure witnesses in his favor, because of "that tenderness
and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly
famous;"7 7 or that equally absurd statement by his illustrious com-
patriot, Sir William Blackstone, that the common law condemned
women to be burned alive at the stake because English gallantry could
not bear to see them maimed and exposed to the public view upon
the common gallows.78
On one point, however, a protest must be recorded. However valu-
able the right to waive a jury trial may be, to bring pressure to bear
"Illinois Crime Survey (1929), p. 103.
1 Ibid.
73 Ibid., pp. 16, 102.
* Op. cit., supra note 1, at p. 191.
" Coke's Littleton, s. 1566.
" Blackatone's Commentaries, Bk. IV, p. 93.
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to force a defendant to exercise that privilege is to convert it from a
right to a weapon of abuse. It should not be necessary to bargain with
the prosecuting attorney or accept trial by the court in order to secure
a prompt disposition of one's case. It would seem that a people who
have elevated the language of the Great Charter, "to no man will I
deny justice, to no man will I delay it," to the position of a constitu-
tional mandate should ponder well the condition of the docket of many
of our criminal courts. No man should be denied equality before the
law because he cannot put up bond. However, other things being equal,
the waiver of jury trial by others should increase the speed of the
wheels of justice and decrease the waiting period for those who are
thus unfortunate.
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